Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-12-1994 
Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"Curcio v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co." (1994). 1994 Decisions. 111. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/111 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
  
 Nos. 93-7545 and 93-7556 
 ___________ 
 
 MARITA L. CURCIO; 
 THE ESTATE OF FREDERICK CURCIO, III 
 
   vs. 
 
 JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; 
 CAPITAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 
 
  John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 
  ("John Hancock"), 
 
     Appellant in No. 93-7545 
 
 
 MARITA L. CURCIO; 
 THE ESTATE OF FREDERICK CURCIO, III 
 
   vs. 
 
 JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; 
 CAPITAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 
 
  MARITA L. CURCIO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF 
THE ESTATE OF FREDERICK CURCIO, III 
 
     Appellant in No. 73-7556 
 ___________ 
  
 Appeal from the United States District Court  
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 92-00789)  
 ___________ 
   
 Argued 
 March 10, 1994 
 Before:  MANSMANN and LEWIS, Circuit Judges and 
       McKELVIE, District Judge.* 
 






* Honorable Roderick R. McKelvie of the United States 
District Court for the  District of Delaware, sitting by 
designation.     
 
Michael D. Fishbein, Esquire (ARGUED) 
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman 
320 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA  19106 
 
  Counsel for Appellee/Cross Appellant Marita L. Curcio 
 
James K. Thomas, II, Esquire 
Richard C. Seneca, Esquire (ARGUED) 
Thomas, Thomas & Hafer 
305 North Front Street 
P.O. Box 999 
Harrisburg, PA  17108 
 
  Counsel for Appellee CAP Health Systems 
 
Alan R. Boynton, Jr., Esquire (ARGUED) 
McNees, Wallace & Nurick 
100 Pine Street 
P.O. Box 1166 
Harrisburg, PA  17108 
 
  Counsel for Appellant 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 Frederick Curcio, III, M.D., died in an automobile 
accident while employed as a full time physician at Harrisburg 
Hospital, which is owned by Capital Health Systems.  Capital 
Health sought to provide to its employees basic life insurance 
coverage and basic accidental death and dismemberment coverage 
through John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company.  Marita L. 
Curcio, Frederick's widow, collected $200,000 in life insurance 
proceeds and $50,000 from the accidental death coverage.  
 
 
Claiming entitlement to an additional $150,000 in accidental 
death benefits because of representations made by Capital Health 
in its plan summary document, she brought an action, individually 
and as executor of Frederick's estate, against Capital Health and 
John Hancock under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Curcio and Capital Health and 
against John Hancock.  John Hancock appeals and Mrs. Curcio 
cross-appeals to preserve her rights against Capital Health.  We 
hold that John Hancock is not responsible either for Capital 
Health's inaccurate representations made to its employees or for 
any additional recovery under John Hancock's clearly stated 
policy.  We further hold that Capital Health is liable under the 
alternative theories of breach of fiduciary duty and equitable 
estoppel.   
 
 I. 
 The historical facts of this case are not in dispute.  
Since October of 1989,1  John Hancock has provided life insurance 
and accidental death and dismemberment insurance for all full-
time Capital Health employees in an amount equal to the 
employee's base annual salary to a maximum of $50,000.  John 
                     
1.   Prior to October, 1989, Capital Health contracted with 
Phoenix and Prudential Insurance Companies for its employee 
insurance program.  In the summer of 1989 Capital Health hired 
Coopers & Lybrand to interview various other insurance companies 
in an effort to acquire a new plan.  Coopers & Lybrand negotiated 
the agreement with John Hancock on behalf of Capital Health. 
 
 
Hancock also offered twenty-one senior employees, who had the 
same basic coverage as the other employees, the opportunity to 
purchase supplemental coverage, for both life and AD&D, up to the 
amount they were currently receiving.  Because no one could be 
added to this group of employees, it became known as the frozen 
group.  Dr. Curcio was not a member of this group.2 
 One year later Capital Health wanted to extend to all 
employees the opportunity to purchase the same supplemental 
coverage from John Hancock as offered to the frozen group.  
Capital Health held group meetings for its employees where it 
introduced the supplemental coverage through an audio-visual 
presentation, explaining that supplemental insurance could be 
purchased in amounts equaling one, two or three times the amount 
of an employee's base annual salary, not to exceed $150,000.  
This coverage amount would be in addition to the coverage amount 
provided by the basic plan.  The presentations clearly 
represented to the employees that this option was available "to 
increase your life and AD&D insurances significantly."  The 
audiotape, which was accompanied by slides, stated in pertinent 
part: 
                     
2.   John Hancock asserts that originally it did not intend 
to provide to the frozen group a policy containing additional 
AD&D benefits.  Although those additional benefits were never 
negotiated with Capital Health, because John Hancock was 
receiving an additional amount in premiums above that which was 
expected for the life coverage and which seemed to represent an 
AD&D premium, John Hancock agreed to add AD&D to the frozen 




  Finally, let's look at other important 
elections you have available under choice 
plus. 
 
  Capital Health provides free group life 
and accidental death and dismemberment -- or 
AD&D -- insurance for all full-time and part-
time employees scheduled to work at least 16 
hours a week.  Each of the coverages is equal 
to: 
 
  • One Times Basic Average Earnings up 
to a Maximum of $50,000 for full-
time employees and, 
 
  • One Times Basic Average Earnings up 
to a Maximum of $25,000 for part-
time employees. 
 
 You also have an opportunity of purchasing 
additional coverages up to three times basic 
average earnings subject to the maximums 
shown on the chart.  (Chart on Screen) 
 
 The contributions you pay for these coverages 
are at low group rates and depend on your 
amount of coverage and your age.  An 
important point:  unless you take advantage 
of increasing your insurance coverages now, 
you will only be able to "step up" one 
additional level of coverage per year -- 
until you reach your coverage limit -- if you 
want higher levels of coverage in the future.  
In short, this is a one time offer.  You can 
either take advantage of the current 
enrollment period to increase your life and 
AD&D insurances significantly or wait until 
future years to increase coverages on a 
slower year to year basis.  (Emphasis added.) 
  
 The dispute is whether the supplemental insurance 
offered to all the employees was the same as the coverage offered 
to the frozen group; specifically, did the supplemental coverage 
include life and AD&D?  John Hancock claims the supplemental 
coverage only included life insurance, and it points to the 
 
 
differing language in each group's policies to support its 
position.3 
 Dr. Curcio's salary made him eligible to purchase the 
maximum amount of coverage, which he did.  Capital Health charged 
him bi-weekly premiums of $6.00 for this coverage.  The record 
indicates, and the district court so found, that Dr. Curcio 
believed his coverage to include both life and AD&D insurance.  
On August 5, 1991, Dr. Curcio died in an automobile accident.    
 A representative from Capital Health, James Henry, made 
an inquiry by telephone to John Hancock regarding a determination 
of benefits due Mrs. Curcio.  Then Assistant Sales Manager, 
Richard Lintner, responded that Dr. Curcio had $400,000 in 
coverage ($50,000 basic life, $50,000 basic AD&D, $150,000 
supplemental life, and $150,000 supplemental AD&D).    
 Shortly thereafter John Hancock recanted its oral 
representation of coverage and expressed, before a claim was 
filed, that its preliminary determination was incorrect and that 
Dr. Curcio had $150,000 in supplemental life coverage only, 
giving his beneficiary a total benefits package of $250,000.  
John Hancock claimed that employees in Dr. Curcio's position 
never had the opportunity to purchase supplemental AD&D coverage, 
                     
3.   Just as in the frozen group's situation a year earlier, 
John Hancock issued new policies to reflect the change in 
coverage.  However, unlike the frozen group's premiums, John 
Hancock argues that the premiums for the general group's new 
policy only included payments for life coverage.  
 
 
and even if they did, Dr. Curcio only paid premiums for $150,000 
in supplemental life coverage.4    
 Subsequently, Mrs. Curcio filed a claim with John 
Hancock for proceeds due.  John Hancock tendered a check to her 
in the amount of $250,000.  Mrs. Curcio initiated this lawsuit to 
recover an additional $150,000 in supplemental AD&D benefits. 
 
 II. 
 The district court concluded that the terms of the 
policy were ambiguous and, applying the doctrine of contra 
proferentum, granted summary judgment against John Hancock in 
favor of Mrs. Curcio.5  John Hancock appeals. 
 The district court also held that Capital Health was 
not a proper party under ERISA because it was neither a benefit 
plan nor a fiduciary, which resulted from the district court's 
finding of a lack of discretion over the determination of 
benefits under the plan.  Thus the district court granted Capital 
                     
4.   Initially Capital Health argued to John Hancock that 
additional AD&D benefits were included in the contributory plan 
and encouraged Mrs. Curcio to file suit against John Hancock to 
challenge the determination of benefits under the policy.  
Capital Health urged John Hancock to honor the additional AD&D 
amount, but John Hancock refused.  Subsequently, Capital Health 
changed its position and now contends that the additional AD&D 
was never included in the policy. 
5.   This suit was originally filed in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.  Because Mrs. Curcio's 
claims were governed by ERISA, John Hancock removed the case to 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  An amended complaint 
was filed on July 16, 1992, asserting theories of relief grounded 
in ERISA.     
 
 
Health's motion for summary judgment.  Mrs. Curcio appeals this 
order as an alternative theory of recovery. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 
our standard of review is plenary.  Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 994 F.2d 130, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1993).  Our task is to 
determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, there exists a genuine issue 
of material fact such that a reasonable factfinder could return a 
verdict for that party.6  Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  
 
 III. 
 We turn first to Mrs. Curcio's claim against John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company.  The parties concur that 
the only basis upon which recovery can be had against John 
Hancock is if there is coverage under the policy that it issued.  
The district court, utilizing the doctrine of contra proferentum, 
found coverage to exist.  This is a question of law subject to 
plenary review on appeal.  Taylor v. Continental Group, 933 F.2d 
1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 The contra proferentum doctrine holds that ambiguities 
in an insurance policy are to be resolved in favor of the 
insured.  Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257 (3d 
                     
6.   In presenting their motions for summary judgment, the 
parties stipulated that the district court adjudicate all claims 
without trial solely on the basis of the written record, 
including the resolution of any material issues of fact. 
 
 
Cir. 1993).  We look to the number of reasonable interpretations 
a given contract, provision, or term may receive in determining 
ambiguity.  Taylor, 933 F.2d at 1232.  If we find but one 
reasonable interpretation, then a fortiori there can be no 
ambiguity.  However, if the language is susceptible to more than 
one reasonable interpretation, then it will be found to be 
ambiguous.  Stendardo v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n,  991 F.2d 
1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 Here the district court held: 
 In this case, we conclude that reasonable 
persons reading the plan descriptions for the 
basic life insurance and the supplemental 
life insurance could fairly come to either of 
the following conclusions:  (1) that AD&D 
coverage is inherent in the phrase "life 
insurance" such that any supplemental life 
insurance purchased would automatically 
include AD&D coverage, or (2) that because 
AD&D is specifically referred to in the basic 
plan and not in the supplemental, it was 
simply not a part of the latter.  While our 
determination that the language is ambiguous 
hinges on an objective reading of the 
challenged passage, we find support for this 
result in the confusion among the defendants 
in the days and weeks following Dr. Curcio's 
death. 
 
Slip op. at 11-12.  We disagree with the district court's 
analysis in two respects.  First, our review of the policy does 
not reveal an ambiguity.  Capital Health seems to have created 
the ambiguity.  Second, the term "life insurance," when given its 
fundamental and universally accepted meaning, does not include 
AD&D coverage.  Although our role here is to determine whether 
there are two possible meanings, were we given the task of 
 
 
interpreting the term, we would hold that the certainty and 
predictability that a literal construction of the term "life 
insurance" would provide would better serve the purposes of 
ERISA.  Cf. Rolhman v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co., 502 N.W.2d 
310 (Mich 1993)(giving a literal construction to the term 
"occupant" in interpreting the Michigan no-fault act).  
 The record reveals that the original policy applicable 
to Dr. Curcio clearly differentiated between life insurance and 
AD&D insurance.  In the table of contents under the heading of 
"COVERAGES," there were two entries.  Each was discussed 
separately, the policy set forth two different filing 
instructions for each respective claim, each had different 
termination periods, and the payment of benefits to beneficiaries 
was provided for separately.  Most importantly, life insurance 
benefits were to be paid upon proof of death; however, AD&D 
benefits were payable in the event of an accident resulting in an 
enumerated injury or death.  The two are mutually exclusive, that 
is, one could exist without the other.  Suggesting that life 
insurance would include AD&D coverage is inconsistent with their 
basic definitions. 
 When Capital Health asked that supplemental insurance 
be made available to all employees, the policy was amended 
accordingly.  First, an amendment which described the schedule 
for the supplemental coverage was added to the original policy, 
which discussed life insurance only.  Subsequently a new policy 
was issued.  This policy, similar to the original, had separate 
entries for life and AD&D coverage.  In setting forth the basic 
 
 
coverage in the master schedule, the new policy mimicked the 
original.  It stated in pertinent part: 
 
 BASIC INSURANCE (Non-Contributory)* 
 Life, Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance 
Class  Life    AD&D (Full Amount) 
 
 
 The very next page described the newly offered 
supplemental life coverage.  Unlike the previous page, it stated: 
 
 SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE (Contributory) 
 Life Insurance 
 
The headings on these pages make clear that the supplemental 
insurance included only life coverage, not AD&D.  Similar to the 
original policy, the new policy also distinguished between life 
and AD&D coverage.  It contained two different entries in the 
table of contents, life and AD&D were discussed separately in the 
text, the policy set forth two different filing instructions for 
each respective claim, each had different termination periods, 
and the payment of benefits to beneficiaries was provided 
separately.  Additionally, the new policy clearly set forth a 90 
day waiting period for basic life and AD&D coverage, but required 
30 days for the supplemental life insurance.  The supplemental 
life coverage terminated at age 70, contrary to AD&D and basic 
life. 
 The foregoing policies and amendments were provided to 
Capital Health, but there is no evidence that Capital Health ever 
distributed them to its employees.  In fact, it appears that when 
John Hancock offered to Capital Health copies of the policies and 
 
 
their amendments to give to the employees, Capital Health 
declined.  Rather, Capital Health chose to make and distribute 
its own summaries.  As we discuss infra, it was Capital Health's 
summary of the new policy that created the confusion. 
 Therefore, we conclude that John Hancock's insurance 
policies were not ambiguous.  Further, the district court's 
suggested interpretation of the term life insurance is overly 
broad; life insurance does not inherently include AD&D insurance.  
The district court erred in the initial steps of its analysis.  
Thus, we will reverse the district court's order granting Mrs. 
Curcio's motion for summary judgment with respect to John Hancock 
and enter an order granting judgment in its favor.7 
 We turn now to the issues involving Capital Health. 
 
 IV. 
 ERISA provides: 
 [A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a 
plan to the extent (i) he exercises any 
discretionary authority or discretionary 
control respecting management of such plan or 
exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets, (ii) 
he renders investment advice for a fee or 
other compensation, direct or indirect, with 
respect to any moneys or other property of 
such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any 
                     
7.   Because we find that the insurance policy is not 
ambiguous, we need not address the parties' arguments regarding 
the district court's use of the contra proferentum doctrine.  We 
note in passing that any question about the use of this doctrine 
in ERISA cases that was left open in Taylor v. Continental Group, 
933 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1991) was answered in our decision in 
Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
 
discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such 
plan. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).8   
 Capital Health argues that ERISA only permits suits to 
recover benefits against the plan as an entity and against the 
fiduciary of the plan, and because Capital Health is neither of 
these, it is not a proper party under ERISA.  Gelardi v. Pertec 
Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing §§ 
1132(d), 1109(a) and 1105).  The district court agreed with 
Capital Health that it is neither a "plan" nor a fiduciary.  We 
believe it self evident that Capital Health is not a "plan;" 
however, we take issue with the failure to find fiduciary status.  
 We agree with the district court that the linchpin of 
fiduciary status under ERISA is discretion.  Here the district 
court found that "John Hancock's refusal to follow Capital 
Health's directive indicates that the employer wielded no 
discretionary authority over the granting of benefits."  Slip op. 
at 11.  Thus it concluded that Capital Health could not be held 
liable for Curcio's benefits.  It appears the district court 
relied on the second phrase of subsection (i) above, "authority 
                     
8.   It is without doubt that the insurance policy at issue 
here is part of an employee benefit plan within the meaning of 
ERISA.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) and (3).  In order to comply with 
ERISA requirements, 29 U.S.C. § 1022, Capital Health published to 
its employees a Statement of ERISA Rights and a list of General 
Provisions and Information.  Further, John Hancock asserted in 
paragraph four of its motion to remove this case to federal court 
that the life insurance policy is an employee welfare plan 




or control respecting management or disposition of its assets," 
as the basis for its decision.  29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).  
Unfortunately, the court failed to examine how the first phrase 
of subsection (i), respecting the management of the plan, or 
subsection (iii), the plan's administration, might affect Capital 
Health's fiduciary status.9  This is where we continue the 
analysis. 
 Our task, simply stated, is to resolve whether Capital 
Health maintained any authority or control over the management of 
the plan's assets, management of the plan in general, or 
maintained any responsibility over the administration of the 
plan.  If we find such to be the case, we have a fortiori found 
Capital Health to be a fiduciary.  We start from the standpoint 
that we have previously held that ERISA broadly defines a 
fiduciary.  Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 141 n.13 
(3d Cir 1993).  See also H. Stennis Little, Jr. and Larry T. 
Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1977). 
 In Smith we found a hospital that gave assurances of 
continued coverage after changing health plans to be a fiduciary 
responsible for its employees' loss in benefits when the new plan 
failed to cover a disabled employee.  We noted that fiduciary 
status under ERISA is broadly defined and held that the 
circumstances of that case dictated our finding that the hospital 
                     
9.   Subsection (ii) does not seem to apply nor does Mrs. 
Curcio so argue.  
 
 
was a fiduciary.  Smith, 6 F.3d at 141 n.3.  The particular 
circumstances of Smith are similar to our facts here.  After the 
hospital decided to replace its Blue Cross/Blue Shield policy 
with a self-funded insurance plan and because the employees had 
the option to convert to an individual Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
policy instead of enrolling in the new plan, the hospital's 
personnel director conducted seminars to help employees make 
their choices.  Id. at 135-36.  On the basis of these actions, we 
found the hospital to have fiduciary status. 
 Similarly, in Genter v ACME Scale & Supply Co., 776 
F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1985), we held that ACME Scale & Supply met 
the ERISA definition of fiduciary as an employer-administrator of 
the plan at issue.  Id. at 1184.  We found that the employer 
exercised discretionary authority and control in managing the 
plan by notifying certain employees when they were eligible for 
an increase in life insurance coverage not explained in the terms 
of the plan.  Id. at 1184-85.  The employer's failure to notify 
all employees generally was deemed a breach of the fiduciary duty 
ERISA imposes.  Id. at 1185-86.  See also Fischer v. Philadelphia 
Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d. Cir. 1993) (finding employer to 
have fiduciary status solely on the basis of its role as plan 
administrator under ERISA); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 
908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that when employers 
serve as plan administrators, they assume the role of fiduciary 
under ERISA).10 
                     




 ERISA makes clear that a fiduciary is one that 
maintains discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility 
in the administration of the plan.11  ERISA defines 
"administrator" as "the person specifically so designated by the 
terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated."  § 
1002(16)(A)(i) (other definitions are stated, but are not 
applicable here).  Capital Health, in its employee benefits 
booklet, labels itself as the plan administrator.12  It seems 
(..continued) 
 
 [W]here an administrator of a plan decides 
matters required in plan administration or 
involving obligations imposed upon the 
administrator by the plan, the fiduciary 
duties imposed by ERISA attach.  Where, 
however, employers conduct businesses and 
make business decisions not regulated by 
ERISA, no fiduciary duties apply.  And, when 
employers wear "two hats" as employers and as 
administrators ". . . they assume fiduciary 
status `only when and to the extent' that 
they function in their capacity as plan 
administrators, not when they conduct 
business that is not regulated by ERISA."   
 
Payonk v. HMW Industries, Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citations omitted). 
11.   Section 1102(a)(1) states that "[e]very employee 
benefit plan . . . shall provide for one or more named 
fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to 
control and manage the operation and administration of the plan."  
Section 1102(a)(2) further states that "the term 'named 
fiduciary' means a fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument, 
or who, pursuant to a procedure specified in the plan, is 
identified as a fiduciary."  We have been unable to locate, nor 
do the parties point out, the "named fiduciary" of the Capital 
Health plan. 
12.   Capital Health calls to our attention a case from the 
Ninth Circuit that it claims supports its position that it is not 
a fiduciary.  Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323 
(9th Cir. 1985).  Gelardi is easily distinguishable for, unlike 
 
 
obvious to us that a plan administrator has responsibility in the 
administration of the plan.  H. Stennis Little, Jr. and Larry T. 
Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1977).   
 Here Capital Health announced the new plan to its 
employees through literature and meetings.  Indeed, at the plan's 
inception John Hancock offered to print booklet certificates for 
each and every employee, but Capital declined.  Capital Health 
chose to print and distribute its own booklet certificates 
describing the plan and each of the plan's amendments.  The 
general information section of the Choice Plus Booklet 
distributed by Capital Health stated that the plan would be 
administered through the Employee Relations Department of Capital 
Health Systems.  It further stated that Capital Health could 
modify or amend the plan at any time at its sole discretion, and 
that Capital Health could terminate the plan at any time.  
Finally, the information provided that a covered person's 
benefits may not be assigned, except by the consent of Capital 
(..continued) 
our case, the employer relinquished its role as plan 
administrator by hiring an outside corporation to administer the 
plan; and as a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the employer 
was not "a fiduciary because it retained no discretionary control 
over the disposition of claims."  Id. at 1325.  Surprisingly, the 
court also held that the retained administrator was not a 
fiduciary because it did not "exercise fiduciary responsibilities 
in the consideration of claims.  [It] perform[ed] only 
administrative functions, processing claims within a framework of 
policies, rules, and procedures established by others."  Id. at 
1325.  We emphasize that the Ninth Circuit, similar to the 
district court here, failed to analyze the definitional section 
of fiduciary pertaining to the plan's administration. § 
1002(21)(A)(iii).   
 
 
Health.  The Supreme Court has held that "one is a fiduciary to 
the extent he exercises any discretionary authority or control."  
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989). 
 We conclude that Capital Health maintained sufficient 
discretionary authority and responsibility in the administration 
of the plan so as to satisfy the statutory definition of a 
fiduciary, § 1002(21)(A)(iii), thus making it a proper party 
under ERISA.13  Therefore, we need not address Curcio's 
contention that ERISA permits suits against parties other than 
plans and fiduciaries.14nn  We caution in passing, as we have 
                     
13.   Our holding is with respect to § 1002(21)(A)(iii) only.  
As stated above, the first phrase of subsection (i), authority or 
control respecting the management of the plan, may also lend 
support; however, it is unnecessary for our conclusion here, and 
we reserve for another day the task of defining its parameters.  
 
 
14.   ERISA affords the beneficiary of an employee benefit 
plan opportunity the ability to bring a civil suit to recover 
benefits due.  It provides in part: 
 (a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action 
 A civil action may be brought-- 
 
  (1) by a participant or beneficiary . . . 
  (B) to recover benefits due to him under the 
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights 
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify 
his rights to future benefits under the terms 
of the plan; 
 
  (2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, 
beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate 
relief under section 1109 of this title; 
 
  (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or 
fiduciary   . . . (B) to obtain other 
appropriate equitable relief . . . (ii) to 
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan. 
 
 
before, that the district courts should not easily fashion 
additional ERISA claims and parties outside congressional intent 
under the guise of federal common law.  Plucinski v. I.A.M. Nat'l 
Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
 V. 
 We have held that an employer can be liable under ERISA 
in its fiduciary capacity for making affirmative 
misrepresentations on breach of fiduciary duty and equitable 
estoppel theories.  Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 
130, 133-35 (3d Cir. 1993).  See also Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular 
Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, No. 93-1892, slip op. 
(..continued) 
 
 *     *     * 
 
 (d) Status of employee benefit plan as entity 
 
  (2)  Any money judgment under this 
subchapter against an employee 
benefit plan shall be enforceable 
only against the plan as an entity 
and shall not be enforceable 
against any other person unless 
liability against such person is 
established in his individual 
capacity under this subchapter.   
 
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (emphasis added).  Mrs. Curcio further contends 
that the "any other person" phrase of § 1132(d)(2) authorizes a 
suit against any person who undertake 
ys a promissory obligation to provide benefits pursuant to the 
terms of an ERISA regulated plan.  Although she argues that such 
is plainly the rule in the Third Circuit, the cases she cites 
clearly do not support this theory.  Heasley v. Belden and Blake 
Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1258 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993); Ulmer v. Harsco 
Corp., 884 F.2d 98, 102 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989); Anthius v. Colt 




at 23 (3d Cir. 1994); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 
141 n.13 (3d Cir. 1993).  Here Mrs. Curcio primarily presents an 
equitable estoppel claim, which is authorized under ERISA 
pursuant to § 1132(a)(3)(B) set forth above.  Bixler v. Central 
Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1298 (3d Cir. 
1993) (holding that § 1132(a)(3)(B) authorizes the award of 
appropriate equitable relief to a beneficiary for violations of 
ERISA).15  She alternatively argues that Capital Health is 
subject to liability for breach of its fiduciary duty pursuant to 
§ 1109.16 
                     
15.   Notably, we have recently held that damages are not 
recoverable under § 1132(a)(1)(B).  Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular 
Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, No. 93-1892, slip op. 
at 24.  Here, Mrs. Curcio relies on § 1132(a)(3)(B). 
16.    (A) Any person who is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations, or duties 
imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter 
shall be personally liable to make good to 
such plan any losses to the plan resulting 
from each such breach, and to restore to such 
plan any profits of such fiduciary which have 
been made through use of assets of the plan 
by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to 
such other equitable or remedial relief as 
the court may deem appropriate, including 
removal of such fiduciary.  A fiduciary may 
also be removed for a violation of section 
1111 of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1109.  
 
 Mrs. Curcio argues that Capital Health need not be a 
fiduciary to be found liable under an equitable estoppel theory 
under ERISA.  Because we find Capital Health to be a fiduciary, 
we need not reach this issue.  Cf. Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group 6 
F.3d 131, 141 n.13 (3d Cir. 1993) (intimating that fiduciary 
status is required to be liable on an equitable estoppel claim 
under ERISA).    
 
 
 We turn first to Mrs. Curcio's primary argument that 
Capital Health's representations made in describing its new plan 
to its employees give rise to an equitable estoppel claim under 
ERISA.  To succeed under this theory of relief, an ERISA 
plaintiff must establish (1) a material representation, (2) 
reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the representation, and 
(3) extraordinary circumstances.  Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 
F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Gridley v. Cleveland 
Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir. 1991)).  The district 
court did not address Mrs. Curcio's estoppel claim, presumably 
because it found Capital Health to be an improper party under 
ERISA.  The determination of an equitable estoppel claim is a 
mixed question of law and fact.  Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135.  Here 
the parties do not dispute the facts -- the written record 
contains all the evidence.  Indeed, in presenting their motions 
for summary judgment, the parties stipulated that the district 
court adjudicate all claims without trial solely on the basis of 
the written record, including the resolution of any material 
issues of fact.  Having found Capital Health to be a proper 
party, we now turn to her equitable theory.17 
                     
17.   The equitable theory of relief under ERISA is not to be 
construed as conflicting with our precedent precluding oral or 
informal amendments to ERISA benefit plans.  Confer v. Custom 
Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1991); Frank v. Colt 
Industries, Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 98 (3d Cir. 1990)' Hozier v. 
Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Cf. Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit 
Pension Plan, No. 93-1892 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994).  Here, Capital 
Health not only made oral representations, but also distributed 





 First, Mrs. Curcio must show that Capital Health made 
material representations.  Capital Health's representations 
regarding supplemental life and supplemental AD&D insurance began 
with an audio-visual presentation that Capital Health made in an 
effort to solicit its employees to enroll in its new insurance 
program entitled "New Choice Plus Flexible Benefits Plan."  The 
audiotape, which was accompanied by slides, stated in pertinent 
part: 
 In short, this is a one time offer.  You can 
either take advantage of the current 
enrollment period to increase your life and 
AD&D insurances significantly or wait until 
future years to increase coverages on a 
slower year to year basis.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 This was not the only time Capital Health discussed 
life and AD&D insurance together.  In the summary plan 
description that Capital Health furnished to its employees for 
the original coverage, the section describing the amounts of 
insurance coverage discussed life and AD&D as separate coverages.  
Nonetheless, in stating the amount of coverage, the summary plan 
document stated that the AD&D coverage would be "[a]n amount 
equal to your Term Life Insurance."  When Capital Health made 
Choice Plus available, the plan that provided supplemental life 
and AD&D coverages, rather than provide a formal amendment to the 
summary plan description, it furnished a pamphlet with a section 
entitled "Group Life & AD&D Insurance Coverages."  Cf. Gridley v. 
Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1991) (overview 
 
 
brochure did not meet ERISA requirements for supplemental summary 
plan description).  This section begins: 
 The Capital Health System provides all 
employees scheduled to work at least 16 hours 
a week with Basic Group Life Insurance and 
Accidental Death and Dismemberment (AD&D) 
Insurance at no cost. 
 
 With Choice Plus you also have the 
opportunity to purchase additional amounts, 
up to three times your Base Annual Earnings, 
at low group rates. 
 
Finally, this section of the pamphlet concludes: 
 
 This pamphlet highlights the Group Life 
Insurance and Accidental Death and 
Dismemberment Insurance coverages available 
to you.  For more detailed information on 
your plans, you should refer to your Summary 
Plan Descriptions covering them.  If 
questions arise, the Legal Plan Documents 
will govern in all cases. 
 
 Although the foregoing is a general summary of the 
coverages discussed in this section of the pamphlet, coupling 
this information, which describes the coverages as separate but 
related, with the other information furnished to the employees, 
it was reasonable for Dr. Curcio to conclude that both life and 
AD&D insurance would continue to be made available in equal 
amounts, that is, in supplemental form.  Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 
1024(b)(1)(A) (requires that material modifications be written in 
a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan 
participant).  Genter v. Acme Scale & Supply Co., 776 F.2d 1180, 
1185 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a "summary plan description 
must not mislead, misinform, or fail to inform participants and 
 
 
beneficiaries of the Plan").  See also Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 
725 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1984)(misleading summary plan 
description coupled with management misrepresentations precluded 
summary judgment for employer). 
 Nevertheless, the question is whether these 
representations are material.  We have held that any provision of 
a plan subject to ERISA that establishes a benefit is a material 
term of the plan.  Baker v. Lukens Steel Co., 793 F.2d 509, 512 
(3d Cir. 1986).  Here Capital Health was actually representing 
that the plan was offering a new benefit; thus, we find that the 
representations Capital Health made were "material 
representations."  See also Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 
994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d. Cir. 1993) ("[A] misrepresentation is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that it would 
mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed 
decision . . . ."). 
 B. 
 Second Mrs. Curcio must demonstrate reasonable and 
detrimental reliance upon the representations Capital Health 
made.  This factor, which is generally referred to as reliance, 
has within it two subfactors: reasonableness and injury.  Smith, 
6 F.3d at 137.18  Mrs. Curcio testified in a sworn statement that 
                     
18.   But see Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 
F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir. 1988)(employee benefit plan claimant who 
had been misled by summary plan description and reassuring letter 
from management, need not show detrimental reliance). Because it 
is inconsistent with our precedents, we have previously declined 
to follow Edwards.  Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 
1310, 1319 n.8 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
 
she and her husband discussed the options available under the 
Choice Plus program, "including increasing the death and 
dismemberment coverage."  She testified that they had recently 
bought a home and because the coverage was so reasonably priced, 
they joked about his dying in an accident, her receiving double 
benefits, and paying off the mortgage.  Subsequent to this 
discussion, Dr. Curcio filled out an enrollment form electing the 
maximum amount of coverage.  This form referred only to "Group 
Life Insurance Options."  One month later, Dr. Curcio signed 
another form confirming his elections and the appropriate payroll 
deductions.  This second form did not distinguish between life 
and AD&D coverage for either basic or supplemental benefits. 
 In Smith we held that the plaintiff's conclusory 
allegations that the Smiths could have obtained alternative 
coverage, without more, were insufficient to withstand summary 
judgment.  Smith, 6 F.3d at 137.  Here we find the meeting 
between Dr. and Mrs. Curcio significant.  There is more than 
conclusory statements; the Curcios had an actual discussion about 
the protection being afforded through the purchase of additional 
AD&D insurance.  For these reasons we conclude that the Curcios 
have suffered an injury in giving up an opportunity to 
accommodate their insurance needs through an independent 
insurance carrier because of their reasonable reliance on Capital 
Health's representations.  Cf. McKnight v. Southern Life and 
Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) ("It is of 
no effect to publish and distribute a plan summary booklet 
designed to simplify and explain a voluminous and complex 
 
 
document, and then proclaim that any inconsistencies will be 
governed by the plan.  Unfairness will flow to the employee for 
reasonably relying on the summary booklet.") 
 
 C. 
 Finally, Mrs. Curcio must demonstrate the existence of 
extraordinary circumstances.  We have not specifically defined 
this term, rather we rely on caselaw to establish its parameters.  
In Rosen v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartender's Union, 
637 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1981), we found that extraordinary 
circumstances existed when the trustee of a pension fund advised 
Rosen that his pension was in jeopardy due to his employer's 
failure to make payments to the fund, allowed Rosen to write out 
a check for the remainder of the employer's debt, and deposited 
the check.  Id. at 598.  We held that the trustee was then 
estopped from asserting that Rosen's payment did not entitle him 
to his pension.  Id.  By contrast, in Gridley v. Cleveland 
Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1991), Gridley, while 
continually and totally disabled in the hospital, increased his 
life insurance coverage under a plan that specifically required 
active, full-time status for such an increase.  Although the 
employer deducted additional amounts from his salary to cover the 
increase, we found that extraordinary circumstances did not exist 
when the insurance carrier refused the additional amount.  Id. at 
1319 (citing Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 




 Under the facts of Smith, which are similar to our case 
here, we held that the fact finder could determine that 
extraordinary circumstances were established.  Smith, 6 F.3d at 
142.  In Smith the hospital repeatedly made written and oral 
assurances that Mrs. Smith had a specific type of coverage.  Id.  
Ironically, here we have another hospital misrepresenting the 
type of coverage for which recipients could enroll.  Capital 
Health compounded its error by reassuring Mrs. Curcio that she 
was covered in the amount of $400,000 after the accidental death 
of her husband.  In the face of such a tragic loss there is a 
certain degree of solace in knowing that financial woes are not 
on the horizon.  Although it was not in Capital Health's control, 
John Hancock contributed to the anguish by first confirming the 
coverage Mrs. Curcio expected and then disclaiming that such 
protection would be forthcoming. 
 The roller coaster did not stop there.  Capital Health 
supported Mrs. Curcio's claim to the point of encouraging her to 
file suit, even offering to pay her legal fees.  It retained 
outside counsel to review the matter and offered his services to 
her without charge. It continually urged John Hancock to honor 
the supplemental AD&D, despite John Hancock's refusal.  Somewhere 
along the way Capital Health had a change of heart, for they now 
argue that supplemental AD&D was never offered in the first 
place.   
 These events in our view are demonstrative of 
extraordinary circumstances.  Thus, having satisfied the elements 
of her equitable estoppel claim and there being no reason to 
 
 
remand for further factual development, we conclude that Mrs. 
Curcio has established Capital Health's liability to her in the 
amount of $150,000.19  Alternatively, we now briefly address Mrs. 
Curcio's argument regarding breach of fiduciary duty.  
 
 VI.  
 In Fischer we held that a plan administrator may not 
materially misrepresent, either negligently or intentionally, 
modifications to an employee pension benefits plan.  "Put simply, 
when a plan administrator speaks, it must speak truthfully."  
Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135.  See also Bixler v. Central Pa. 
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 
1993) (discussing fiduciary's duty not to misinform); Kurz v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(discussing the holding in Fischer).  We further held in Fischer 
that material misrepresentations would subject a plan 
administrator to liability for breach of its fiduciary duty.  
Fischer, 994 F.2d at 133-34 (citing Payonk v. HMW Indus., Inc., 
883 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989)).  We have just found Capital Health 
responsible for making material misrepresentations for purposes 
                     
19.   The dissent suggests, inter alia, that we should remand 
to the district court for factfinding on the elements of 
equitable estoppel.  We note, however, that the parties do not 
dispute the facts.  The parties stipulated that the district 
court adjudicate all claims without trial solely on the basis of 
the written record, including the resolution of any material 
issues of fact.  We are of the view that reasonable minds could 
not differ on the establishment of the elements of equitable 
estoppel in this case.  Accordingly, it is appropriate for us to 
require the district court to enter judgment.   
 
 
of an equitable theory of relief.  It is thus a short step to 
conclude that Capital Health breached its fiduciary duty. 
 Our analysis rests on the notion that a fiduciary is 
required to "discharge [its] duties with respect to a plan solely 
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries."  29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  See Fischer, 994 F.2d at 133.  Clearly 
Capital Health did not do so.  Therefore, we hold that Mrs. 
Curcio's alternate argument provides additional support for our 
conclusion that Capital Health is liable to Mrs. Curcio for the 
$150,000 in supplemental AD&D. 
 
 VII. 
 On the basis of the foregoing, we will reverse in part 
and affirm in part the district court's order.  We will reverse 
that part of the order which denied John Hancock's motion for 
summary judgment and granted it in favor of Capital Health.  We 
will affirm that part of the court's order which granted Mrs. 
Curcio's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in her 
favor, but we will reverse the judgment entered against John 
Hancock and enter it against Capital Health in the amount of 
$150,000.    
 
 
McKELVIE, District Judge, dissenting. 
 I agree that the district court should grant summary 
judgment in favor of John Hancock.  However, I believe that this 
court should remand the claims against Capital Health for further 
proceedings. 
 One could summarize the facts in this case as follows.  
Capital promised its employees, including Dr. Curcio, a package 
of benefits.  Capital promised to set up a plan, to provide free 
life and AD&D insurance through the plan, and to make available 
the opportunity to purchase supplemental insurance.  Capital 
named itself the "Plan Administrator," and took on the 
responsibility of describing the terms of the plan to the 
beneficiaries.  Capital negotiated an insurance contract with 
John Hancock.  Hancock had no direct contact with the 
beneficiaries.  Capital collected payments from the employees, 
added its own contribution, and sent Hancock a lump sum payment 
every month.  The plan owns no relevant assets other than its 
contract with Hancock.  Dr. Curcio purchased as much life and 
AD&D insurance as was available, and named his wife as 
beneficiary.  Mrs. Curcio alleges, and Capital denies, that the 
supplemental insurance Capital promised to make available 
includes an additional $150,000 of AD&D coverage.  Regardless of 
what Capital may have promised its employees, Hancock's contract 
with Capital does not obligate Hancock to pay supplemental AD&D 
benefits. 
 Procedural Posture and Standard of Review 
 
 
 In the district court, the parties filed motions for 
summary judgment.  The parties also stipulated that the district 
court could adjudicate all claims based solely on the written 
record without a trial, including the resolution of any material 
issues of fact.  The district court found as a matter of law that 
Capital is not liable and Hancock is liable.  The district court 
then entered summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Curcio and against 
Hancock, and in favor of Capital.  The district court did so 
without resolving the remaining issues of fact. 
 Entry of summary judgment is only appropriate if when 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact such 
that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for that 
party.  Slip op. at 7-8.  This court's review of an order 
granting summary judgment is plenary.  Fischer v. Philadelphia 
Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 
S.Ct. 622 (1993).  If genuine issues of material fact remain 
unresolved, they should be resolved by the trier of fact.  The 
district court is the trier of fact in this case.  An appellate 
court should not act as the factfinder, even where all evidence 
comes from documents.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of 
fact [by a trial judge], whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . 
."). 
 Enforcement of Plan Benefits 
 Mrs. Curcio argues that Capital promised to make 
available $150,000 in supplemental AD&D coverage, and that this 
 
 
promise is enforceable under the benefits enforcement section of 
ERISA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) ("A civil action may be 
brought . . . by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover 
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his 
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to 
future benefits under the terms of the plan . . . .").  Capital 
argues that it did not make such a promise, and that in any event 
its promises are unenforceable because Capital is neither a plan 
nor a fiduciary.  The district court, relying on Gelardi, agreed 
with Capital that ERISA permits liability only against plans and 
fiduciaries.  See Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 
1323, 1324-5 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 I believe that ERISA does permit a person to sue an 
employer to enforce contractual promises made by the employer, 
regardless of whether or not the employer is a plan or a 
fiduciary.  See Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 
1980) (enforcing contractual rights against an employer where the 
plan is not a party), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).  None 
of the sections of ERISA cited by the Gelardi court give any 
limitation on who may be sued.  See Lee v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
America, 673 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (N.D.Cal. 1987).  Indeed, 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(d) expressly contemplates that a person other than 
a plan may be held liable.  One of Congress' primary purposes for 
enacting ERISA is "to protect contractually defined benefits."  
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 US 101, 113 (1989).  I 
believe that permitting employees to sue their employers for 
allegedly breaking promises relating to a benefits plan is 
 
 
neither novel nor contrary to Congress' intent.  See Sprague v. 
General Motors Corporation, 768 F. Supp. 605, 612 (E.D.Mich. 
1991). 
 There is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether 
Capital promised to supply the Curcios with $150,000 of AD&D 
coverage.  The task of determining the terms of a plan, and 
interpreting those terms, should be left in the first instance to 
the trial court.  See Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 967 
F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1992).  I would therefore remand the case to 
the district court for further findings of fact. 
 Equitable Estoppel 
 I disagree with the majority's decision to grant 
summary judgment against Capital on the equitable estoppel cause 
of action.  Mrs. Curcio has not established that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact as to all elements of this claim. 
 An ERISA beneficiary may recover benefits under an 
equitable estoppel theory "upon establishing a material 
representation, reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the 
representation, and extraordinary circumstances."  Smith v. 
Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 1993); cf. 
Restatement, Second, Contracts § 90 (common law doctrine of 
promissory estoppel).  Mrs. Curcio testified by affidavit that in 
the fall of 1990 her husband told her that he had seen a video 
tape at work, the video tape described his insurance benefits, 
and it was his understanding that these benefits included extra 
AD&D insurance.  The majority finds that the representations made 
on this tape were material, that the Curcios reasonably relied on 
 
 
these representations to their detriment, and that extraordinary 
circumstances exist in this case.  The district court did not 
make findings on these questions. 
 A trier of fact could find that it would not be 
reasonable for the Curcios to rely on the representations in the 
video presentation.  The majority quotes from a pamphlet which 
Capital distributed to its employees.  Slip op. at 22-23.  A 
section of this pamphlet, titled "GROUP LIFE & AD&D Insurance 
Coverages," contains a subsection titled "An Opportunity to 
Purchase Supplemental Amounts of Insurance Coverages."  The first 
sentence of this subsection states, "Through Choice Plus, you can 
purchase additional amounts of Group Life insurance at low group 
rates."  There is no mention of any opportunity to purchase 
additional amounts of AD&D.  Louise Reich, an employee of 
Capital, testified by affidavit that Dr. Curcio would have 
received a copy of a "Physician Fringe Benefit Summary."  The 
Summary states that a physician may purchase "additional 
supplemental life," but does not mention any opportunity to 
purchase additional AD&D.  A trier of fact may, or may not, find 
it reasonable to rely on one's memory of a taped presentation 
which may be in conflict with written materials. 
 To establish the elements of detrimental reliance, a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant's representations induced 
action or forbearance, and that the plaintiff was harmed by this 
action or forbearance.  Restatement, Second, Contracts § 90; see 
also Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2856 (1991).  Mrs. Curcio has 
 
 
failed to present any evidence of detrimental reliance.  The 
majority, finding that the Curcios did detrimentally rely on 
Capital's representations, seems to employ the following 
reasoning: Mrs. Curcio testified that she and her husband 
believed they had the opportunity to purchase supplemental AD&D 
insurance through Capital's benefits program.  Therefore, they 
had the opportunity to purchase additional insurance through an 
independent insurance carrier.  Therefore, they would have 
purchased additional AD&D coverage if only they had known that 
the death benefits provided by Hancock totalled $250,000, and not 
$400,000.  See slip op. at 24-26. 
 As in Smith, there is no evidence that the Curcios 
could have obtained AD&D coverage from an independent insurance 
carrier.  Cf. Smith, 6 F.3d at 137 ("the Smiths' conclusory 
allegations that they could have obtained alternative coverage, 
without more, were insufficient to withstand summary judgment").  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Curcios had any 
intention of seeking insurance from an independent carrier.  Mrs. 
Curcio has not proven that representations in the video tape 
caused detrimental reliance; there is no evidence that the 
representations induced any act or forbearance. 
 The majority concludes that extraordinary circumstances 
exist in this case, in part because it finds that the 
inconsistent positions taken by the defendants after Dr. Curcio's 
death forced Mrs. Curcio to embark on a roller coaster ride of 
anguish.  Slip op. at 26-27.  Several aspects of this portion of 
the majority's opinion are troubling.  First, there seems to be 
 
 
no standard for determining what makes an event "extraordinary," 
nor does the majority attempt to define a standard.  It appears 
that when courts first recognized equitable estoppel as a cause 
of action in ERISA cases, the element of "extraordinary 
circumstances" was added in order to protect the actuarial 
soundness of pension funds.  See Rosen v. Hotel and Restaurant 
Emp., Etc., 637 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 898 (1981); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 n. 8 (8th 
Cir. 1976).  In a case where a fund is a defendant, a court could 
at least balance the desire to make the plaintiff whole against 
the need to ensure that the fund had sufficient assets to satisfy 
its obligation to future claimants.  Here, where no fund is 
involved, the nebulous term "extraordinary" loses what definition 
it had, as there is no longer any stated purpose for the 
existence of the element. 
 Second, the case for finding extraordinary 
circumstances seems rather weak.  In support of its conclusion 
that extraordinary circumstances exist, the majority makes the 
following arguments: (1) Capital misrepresented the Curcio's 
insurance coverage; (2) Capital repeated that mistake after Dr. 
Curcio died; (3) Hancock made the same mistake after Dr. Curcio 
died; (4) these mistakes caused Mrs. Curcio to experience 
anguish; and (5) for a while, Capital attempted to help Mrs. 
Curcio recover the disputed $150,000 from Hancock.  See slip op. 
at 26-27.  As every plaintiff in an estoppel case must prove 
detrimental reliance on a material representation, the fact that 
Capital made a misrepresentation could not possibly be an 
 
 
extraordinary event.  The fact that Capital repeated its mistake 
after Dr. Curcio died may be unfortunate, but it is beyond 
dispute that at that point it was too late to make other 
insurance arrangements.  There is no evidence in the record that 
Mrs. Curcio suffered anguish, or any other harm, from the 
mistakes made after Dr. Curcio's death.  It seems strange to 
penalize Capital for mistakes made by Hancock, and even stranger 
to penalize Capital for attempting to help Mrs. Curcio recover 
the benefits she claimed. 
 Third, the existence of extraordinary circumstances 
should be determined by the trier of fact.  See Smith, 6 F.3d at 
142.  I do not think that the circumstances identified by the 
majority are so extreme in this case as to warrant this court 
finding that extraordinary circumstances exist. 
 Finally, even if Mrs. Curcio could prove all elements 
of her estoppel claim, the recovery may be less than $150,000.  
Full enforcement of a promise is often appropriate in an estoppel 
case.  However, depending on the facts of the case, it may be 
appropriate to limit the recovery.  See Restatement, Second, 
Contracts § 90 Comment d.  Equitable estoppel is an equitable 
doctrine, and is subject to the discretion of the trial court.  
See Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1989) ("when 
a trial court makes an equitable assessment after the operative 
facts are established, we review that assessment for abuse of 
discretion."); Plucinski v. I.A.M. Nat. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 
1052, 1053 (3d Cir. 1989) ("because the district court did not 
address the equities . . . we remand for a development of the 
 
 
record, and for the district court to exercise its equitable 
discretion"). 
 Misrepresentation 
 The majority states, correctly, that "a plan 
administrator may not materially misrepresent, either negligently 
or intentionally, modifications to an employee pension benefits 
plan."  Slip op. at 28.  The majority then finds that Mrs. Curcio 
established her claim for negligent misrepresentation.  The 
majority makes no attempt to show why summary judgment is 
appropriate on the issue of whether or not Capital made its 
representations negligently or intentionally.  The trier of fact 
should determine these questions in the first instance. 
 Furthermore, even if Mrs. Curcio does establish all 
elements of this cause of action, it is far from clear that she 
should receive an award of $150,000.  The amount of damages for 
negligent misrepresentation by a fiduciary is not necessarily 
measured by the content of the misrepresentation, but by the 
damage caused to the beneficiary or by the profit received by the 
fiduciary as a result of the misrepresentation.  Restatement, 
Second, Trusts § 205 Comment a.  There is no evidence that 
Capital gained by its representations.  As discussed above, there 
is also no evidence that Mrs. Curcio would have received greater 
death benefits but for Capital's misrepresentations.  Therefore, 
it is inappropriate to direct the district court to award 




 The trial court granted Mrs. Curcio's motion for 
summary judgment against Hancock, and granted Capital's motion 
for summary judgment against Mrs. Curcio.  The majority disagrees 
with both decisions, yet instead of reversing both decisions it 
purports to affirm the judgment in favor of Mrs. Curcio and 
reverse on the question of which defendant loses.  I would 
reverse both grants of summary judgment, direct that summary 
judgment be entered in favor of Hancock and against Mrs. Curcio, 
and remand for further proceedings on Mrs. Curcio's claims 
against Capital. 
 I respectfully dissent. 
